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LITIGATING LABOR RIGHTS ACROSS A 
DEMILITARIZED ZONE: THE SOUTH KOREAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AS A FORUM TO ADDRESS 
LABOR VIOLATIONS IN NORTH KOREA’S KAESONG 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE 
Lavanga V. Wijekoon† 
Abstract:  South Korea heralds North Korea’s Kaesong Special Economic Zone as a 
shining example of inter-Korean cooperation.  South Korean corporations at Kaesong 
combine South Korean expertise with North Korean labor.  However, Kaesong 
operations violate the North Korean workers’ labor rights.  
This Comment explores the legal mechanisms available in South Korea to hold 
violative South Korean Kaesong corporations accountable.  The South Korean 
Constitutional Court should entertain a constitutional petition from the North Korean 
workers.  Such petition will compel the South Korean government to recognize the North 
Korean workers’ rights under the South Korean Constitution and hold violative South 
Korean corporations at Kaesong accountable through stricter regulations and sanctions. 
Practical and procedural obstacles hinder Kaesong workers from pursuing relief in 
the South Korean Constitutional Court.  First, the North Korean government bars the 
workers from leaving North Korea.  Second, the South Korean Constitutional Court bars 
third parties in South Korea from filing a petition on behalf of the workers.  Third, the 
court has no clear jurisdiction over constitutional claims brought by North Korean 
workers in North Korea.  Fourth, the court bars suit under pseudonyms, leaving potential 
petitioners vulnerable to retaliatory employment action.  
Given these impediments, the Constitutional Court and the South Korean legislature 
should look to international developments in procedural law that facilitate transnational 
rights litigation.  The court and legislature should adopt new court procedures that permit 
foreign petitioners physically absent in the jurisdiction to file in the Constitutional Court.  
Further, the South Korean government and South Korean shareholders of Kaesong 
corporations should take measures outside the courts to hold the corporations 
accountable. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An hour’s car ride from Seoul into the demilitarized zone that divides 
the Korean Peninsula into North and South Korea lies possibly the world’s 
most heavily guarded Special Economic Zone (“SEZ”).1  The SEZ is 
                                           
†
 Juris Doctor and Masters in International Studies expected in 2009, University of Washington, 
School of Law and The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. The author would like to thank 
Ms. Patricia Goedde and Professor Joel Ngugi for their valuable guidance and suggestions on this 
Comment. The author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
for their hard work and commitment. Any errors and omissions are the author’s own.  
1
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NORTH KOREA: WORKERS’ RIGHTS AT THE KAESONG INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX 1 (2006) [hereinafter HRW], available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/korea1006/ 
korea1006web.pdf.  A “Special Economic Zone” is defined as an area where enterprises are treated more 
preferentially than in other areas in relation to such matters as the tax rate and the scope of operations in 
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comprised of a collection of factories, ringed by security fences.2  This 
fortress of factories is the Kaesong Industrial Park (“Kaesong”), the poster-
child of North Korea’s “capitalist experiment.”3  Opened in 2004, Kaesong 
boasts the sponsorship of the South Korean government and South Korean 
companies such as Hyundai Asan.4  Work at Kaesong combines South 
Korean technology and know-how with North Korean labor.5  
The South Korean government sees Kaesong as the embodiment of 
South Korea’s earnest efforts in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War and 
pursuing a policy of reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea.6  
South Korea hopes that this economic partnership will push North Korea 
toward economic reform and greater openness to the world.7  For both 
Koreas, Kaesong also represents a cornerstone in the efforts towards the 
eventual reunification of South and North Korea8 into the ethnically 
homogeneous “Korean nation.”9 
Recently, this particular inter-Korean relationship has drawn criticism 
for egregious labor rights violations in Kaesong.  Rights activists claim that 
the North Korean government cheats the workers by not giving them their 
full pay, by expecting them to work unpaid overtime, and by barring them 
from forming labor unions.10  The United States government has labeled the 
workers “trafficking victims”11 and claimed that Kaesong demonstrates that 
South Korea economically supports the repressive Kim Jong-Il regime.12  
                                                                                                                              
order to attract foreign capital and advanced technology for modernization.  See Sonoko Nishitateno, 
China’s Special Economic Zones: Experimental Units for Economic Reform, 32 INT’L & COMP L.Q. 175, 
176 (1983). 
2
  Norimitsu Onishi, South Brings Capitalism, Well Isolated, to North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2006, at A3. 
3
  Id.  
4
  HRW, supra note 1. 
5
  Jan Jettel, Kaesong Industrial Park Emerges as NK Human Rights Flashpoint, KOREA TIMES, 
April 13, 2006, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200604/kt2006041317270310220.htm. 
6
  See Welcome to the Ministry of Unification, http://www.unikorea.go.kr/english/EAM/ 
EAM0102I.jsp (last visited Aug. 21, 2007). 
7
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
8
  Id. 
9
  GI-WOOK SHIN, ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN KOREA: GENEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND LEGACY 3 (2006).  
Both Koreas believe in a “ethnic homogeneity-national unification thesis,” which declares that a politically 
divided Korea must and will be reunified as Koreans are ethnically homogenous.  Id. at 186. 
10
  HRW, supra note 1, at 6. 
11
  Christopher Carpenter, US Questions Legitimacy of Kaesong Wage System, KOREA TIMES, June 7 
2006.  A former Western diplomat has compared the working conditions at Kaesong to those of a “labor 
camp.”  Peter Ritter, Risky Business: Investing in North Korea Might Seem Like a Crazy Idea, but Some 
Are Betting that Stronger Commercial Links Could Push the Hermit Kingdom Toward Reform, TIME, 
October 22, 2007. 
12
  See State Dep’t Press Releases & Documents, Labor Contracts with North Korea Inadvisable, 
U.S. Envoy Says, Jan. 16, 2007; Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
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The starting point of this Comment is the following statement on 
Kaesong made by Human Rights Watch:  “Seoul (and Pyongyang alike) 
must ensure basic rights and protections of the North Korean workers.”13  
This Comment argues that a judicial mandate from the South Korean 
Constitutional Court can compel the South Korean government to recognize 
the North Korean workers’ rights.  The court has authority to extend its 
jurisdiction over Kaesong workers.  South Korean constitutional law offers 
North Korean workers the opportunity to make a constitutional petition 
based on an equal protection claim in the Constitutional Court.  By granting 
this petition, the court can compel the South Korean government to 
recognize the workers’ rights and hold the offending South Korean 
corporations accountable through regulations and sanctions. 
However, filing this petition in South Korea is no straightforward 
task.  The workers are physically restricted to North Korean territory by the 
North Korean state.  Procedural barriers inherent in the South Korean legal 
system compound this practical barrier.  However, recent developments in 
procedural law in other countries have facilitated rights actions against 
transnational corporations in the individual corporation’s home country.  The 
South Korean legislature and the Constitutional Court should look to these 
international trends in adopting procedural reforms that will allow the North 
Korean workers to file a constitutional petition in the Constitutional Court. 
Non-judicial measures in South Korea will complement the workers’ 
constitutional petition.  For example, South Korea should make extant 
governmental assistance to Kaesong corporations conditional upon a record 
of good labor practices.  Further, South Korean shareholders of violative 
Kaesong corporations should use shareholder resolutions to compel 
corporate authorities to protect workers’ rights. 
This Comment proposes a comprehensive solution for Kaesong 
workers to obtain legal redress for labor rights violations at Kaesong.  Part II 
of this Comment shows how Kaesong operations violate labor rights.  Part 
III argues that international guidelines place no legal obligation upon South 
Korean corporations to protect Kaesong workers’ rights.  Part IV advocates 
that Kaesong workers be given the opportunity to seek redress by bringing 
an equal protection claim in the South Korean Constitutional Court.  Part V 
shows that practical and procedural barriers will hinder the worker’s 
potential suit.  Part VI advocates that the Constitutional Court and the South 
Korean legislature adopt international developments in procedural law to 
                                           
13
  Human Rights Watch, North Korea: Labor Rights at Risk in Joint Industrial Complex: South 
Korean Companies Violate Labor Law, Oct. 3, 2006, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/ 
10/02/nkorea14284.htm. 
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remove procedural barriers inherent in South Korean law.  Part VII urges 
that non-judicial measures be used also to hold offending corporations 
accountable.  Part VIII acknowledges that the viability of these 
recommendations depends on the political vicissitudes of foreign relations 
between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. 
II. BACKGROUND: LABOR VIOLATIONS TARNISH KAESONG AS A SYMBOL 
OF INTER-KOREAN COOPERATION 
The Kaesong SEZ is heralded as a shining example of North Korea’s 
“capitalist experiment”14 and is a potent symbol of inter-Korean 
cooperation.15  South Korea’s interest in the success and expansion of 
Kaesong goes beyond mere economic gain as Kaesong also represents a step 
forward in engaging North Korea and bringing stability to the Korean 
peninsula.16  However, violations of the North Korean workers’ labor rights 
at Kaesong taint this ambitious exercise of economic cooperation.17 
A. South Korea Sees Kaesong as a Significant Development in Peacefully 
Engaging North Korea 
The Kaesong SEZ opened in June 2004 and is located between the 
North Korean city of Kaesong and the border between the two Koreas.18  It 
was established through a contract between North Korea, the South Korean 
Hyundai Asan Corporation, and South Korea’s state-owned Korea Land 
Corporation.19  The North Korean workers at Kaesong produce goods such 
as shoes, kitchenware, and clothes.20  These products are primarily intended 
for the South Korean market.21  As of October 2007, twenty-six South 
Korean companies had opened facilities at Kaesong, employing about 
19,430 North Korean workers.22  Largely because of Kaesong’s productivity, 
North Korean exports to the South increased by 63.3% in the first half of 
                                           
14
  See Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
15
  Jettel, supra note 5. 
16
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
17
  See HRW, supra note 1, at 1. 
18
  “Communist” Korea Violates Workers’ Rights, INDUS. WORKER (Indus. Workers of the World, 
Cincinatti, Ohio), Nov. 1, 2006, at 12. 
19
  Id.  
20
  Id.  
21
  Id.  
22
  The Associated Press, Inter-Korean Complex Surpasses U.S. $200 Million Worth of Goods, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 10, 2007. 
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2007.23  South Korean officials have stated ambitious plans to expand the 
SEZ to 2000 companies, employing 700,000 North Koreans.24 
Kaesong was initiated with the blessing of South Korea’s previous 
Kim Dae-Jung administration, and the current South Korean government 
lauds it as a symbol of inter-Korean cooperation.25  South Korea’s President 
Roh is convinced that progress in the economic development of North Korea 
is a shortcut to democratization.26  Accordingly, President Roh earmarked 
1.184 trillion won (approximately U.S. $1.27 billion) in the fiscal year 2005 
for spending on North Korean economic cooperation, with emphasis on 
developing Kaesong.27  This approach relates to the concept that peace on 
the Korean peninsula and the prosperity of the Korean people are tied to 
each other and trigger synergistic effects.28  Thus, Kaesong also represents 
one of South Korea’s biggest efforts at engaging the North in de facto 
unification.29 
To these ambitious ends, the South Korean government has also 
provided tax breaks and other support to both state and private South Korean 
corporations in Kaesong.30  The South Korean government has actively 
publicized the advantages of locating at Kaesong to South Korean 
corporations.31  Among the main advantages are low labor costs and an 
abundant labor force.32  Wage rates for North Korean workers are roughly 
half the rates in comparable industries in China33 and provide a strong 
incentive for Korean firms to locate at Kaesong.34 
B. Kaesong Operations Violate North Korean Workers’ Rights 
Recently, rights activists and the United States government have 
brought to light several forms of labor rights violations at Kaesong.  The 
                                           
23
  Ritter, supra note 11. 
24
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
25
  See Jettel, supra note 5. Kim Dae-Jung’s administration spanned between 1997 and December 
2002.  See Kim Dae-Jung’s Tainted Legacy, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 
2590389.stm (last visited Aug. 21, 2007). 
26
  Hiroshi Minegishi, South Korea Frontloading Larger Budget Helping North, NIKKEI WEEKLY, 
Jan. 31, 2005. 
27
  Id.  
28
  MIN CHO, ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULAR AND THE OUTLOOK FOR 
UNIFICATION 2 (2007). 
29
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
30
  Id.   
31
  See generally, Welcome to the Ministry of Unification, supra note 6. 
32
  Id.   
33
  James Brooke, An Industrial Park in North Korea Nears a Growth Spurt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 
2006, at C5. 
34
  Jettel, supra note 5.  
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most egregious violation alleged is that the North Korean government cheats 
the North Korean workers of their full pay.35  Other allegations declare that 
unions are banned36 and overtime work is unpaid.37 
The taking of North Korean workers’ wages by the North Korean 
government is a blatant violation of the Labor Regulations for the Gaeseong 
Industrial Zone (“Kaesong Labor Law”) adopted in 2003 by the North 
Korean state legislature.38  Article 25 of the Kaesong Labor Law stipulates 
that North Korean workers must be paid a minimum of U.S. $50 per 
month.39  Article 32 of the Kaesong Labor Law mandates that “each 
enterprise,” including the South Korean companies at Kaesong, must pay 
minimum wage to the workers directly in cash.40  However, Kaesong 
companies pay the wages to a North Korean government labor broker.41  
South Korean managers admit they have “no idea” how much of the salary is 
passed on to the workers from the broker.42  Human Rights Watch reports 
that the North Korean government takes thirty percent of the wages as a 
mandatory contribution to a fund that provides the workers with free 
housing, healthcare, and education.43  The U.S. State Department reports that 
North Korea may be expropriating as much as forty-five percent of these 
salaries44 and characterizes this practice as “forced labor” and the workers as 
“trafficking victims.”45 
Even though the payment of the mandatory fees is incorporated into 
the Kaesong labor law, the manner in which the fees are taken away from 
the workers’ wages violates that law.  Article 42 of the Kaesong Labor Law 
requires that each enterprise pay a monthly social insurance premium equal 
to fifteen percent of its monthly payroll for North Korean citizens.46  Article 
43 mandates that North Korean citizens will pay a “given portion” of their 
monthly salaries towards a “social and cultural policy fee.”47  However, this 
                                           
35
  Id.; Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2; Brooke, supra note 33; HRW, supra note 1, at 1.   
36
  Jettel, supra note 5; Brooke, supra note 33.  
37
  Jettel, supra note 5.  
38
  Labor Regulations for the Gaeseong Industrial Zone (adopted as Decision No.2 by the Standing 
Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Sept. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Kaesong Labor Regulations], 
available at http://unikorea.go.kr/english/EUP/EUP0201R.jsp (follow “LIST” hyperlink; then follow 
“article No. 22” hyperlink) (last visited Oct 26, 2007).  
39
  Id. art. 25; HRW, supra note 1, at 6.  
40
  Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 32; HRW, supra note 1, at 6. 
41
  Brooke, supra note 33. 
42
  Id.  
43
  HRW, supra note 1, at 6. 
44
  State Dep’t Press Releases & Documents, supra note 12. 
45
  Carpenter, supra note 11. 
46
  Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 42. 
47
  Id. art. 43. 
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statutory language neither permits the South Korean companies to pay 
wages to North Korean state officials nor permits the officials’ practice of 
taking an indeterminate portion of those wages before the wages are handed 
to the workers.  While North Korea’s actions blatantly violate the Kaesong 
Labor Law, state-run and private South Korean companies at Kaesong are 
also complicit in these wrong-doings. 
Labor rights violations at Kaesong also include prohibitions on union 
formation and operation48 and the expectation that workers must work 
unpaid overtime.49  Shortcomings in the Kaesong Labor Law have allowed 
South Korean corporations and the North Korean government to commit 
these violations with impunity.50  Although the Kaesong Labor Law 
addresses certain workers’ rights, many of the most fundamental rights are 
missing, including the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, the right to strike, the prohibition of sex discrimination and 
sexual harassment, and the ban on harmful child labor.51  Thus, the on-going 
violations at Kaesong raise the specter of other unreported violations.52 
III. INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES DIRECT BUT DO NOT REQUIRE SOUTH 
KOREAN CORPORATIONS AT KAESONG TO PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF 
NORTH KOREAN WORKERS 
International codes of conduct for transnational corporations direct the 
South Korean corporations at Kaesong to conform to international labor 
rights standards.  The current international codes of conduct are the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (“OECD Guidelines”) and the International Labor 
Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises & Social Policy (“ILO Declaration”).53  While these guidelines 
set ideal standards, they do not place a legal duty upon the corporations to 
protect labor rights.  Thus, as “soft law,”54 the OECD Guidelines and the 
ILO Declaration place aspirational, but legally unenforceable, obligations 
upon the South Korean corporations at Kaesong. 
                                           
48
  Jettel, supra note 5; HRW supra note 1, at 12.   
49
  Jettel, supra note 5. 
50
  North Korea: Labor Rights at Risk in Joint Industrial Complex, U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, Oct. 3, 
2006. 
51
  HRW, supra note 1, at 2. 
52
  U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, supra note 50. 
53
  BINDA PREET SAHNI, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE LIABILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN 
INJURY 47 (2006). 
54
  In international law “soft law” constitutes “[g]uidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct 
that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
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A. The OECD Guidelines Place Non-Enforceable Duties on South 
Korean Corporations to Recognize Kaesong Workers’ Rights 
Although Kaesong is situated in North Korean territory, South Korea 
has a responsibility as a member of the OECD to ensure that South Korean 
corporations respect international labor standards as laid out in OECD 
Guidelines.55  The OECD Guidelines establish principles and standards that 
cover a broad range of issues in business ethics including employment, 
industrial relations, and human rights.56  Each country that is a member of 
OECD is expected to recommend to multinationals headquartered in that 
country to consider voluntarily adopting and complying with OECD 
Guidelines.57  As a party to the OECD Convention since 1996, South Korea 
has made a commitment to “align its economic system more closely with 
international standards.”58  OECD Guidelines explicitly state, “where 
corporate conduct and human rights intersect . . . [multinational enterprises] 
are encouraged to respect human rights . . . in their dealings with 
employees . . . in a manner that is consistent with host governments’ 
international obligations and commitments.”59  Because North Korea is party 
to four main human rights treaties that protect workers’ rights, OECD 
Guidelines thus direct South Korean companies in Kaesong to respect the 
human rights of the North Korean workers.60  Furthermore, OECD 
workplace guidelines include the right to free association and collective 
bargaining61—rights that have been denied to Kaesong workers.62   
However, the OECD Guidelines are aspirational and do not place a 
binding legal obligation upon South Korean corporations.  The guidelines 
merely constitute an instrument of soft law.63  Consequently, the OECD 
Guidelines do not provide the workers with a cause of action for legal relief. 
                                           
55
  HRW, supra note 1, at 5.  
56
  Theodora M. Lee & Littler Mendelson, Global Employment Claims: Emerging International 
Labor and Employment Issues, in LITIGATION 2005, at  681 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 730, PLI Order No. 6740, 2005). 
57
  Id.  
58
  Economist Intelligence Unit, South Korea: The Operating Environment, TMC.NET, Aug. 8, 2007, 
http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/08/08/2848638.htm. 
59
  Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development [OECD], The OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications 41 (rev. ed. 2000), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. 
60
  HRW, supra note 1, at 4. North Korea is party to International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women and Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
61
  Lee & Mendelson, supra note 56. 
62
  See supra Part II.B 
63
  SAHNI, supra note 53, at 47.  
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B. The ILO Declaration Requests but Does Not Require South Korean 
Courts to Recognize Kaesong Workers’ Rights 
The ILO Declaration is also a universal legal instrument that offers 
guidelines to multinational corporations, employers, and workers’ 
organizations.64  It relates to such areas as employment, training, conditions 
of work and life, and industrial relations.65  The ILO Declaration compels 
the government of a member state to ensure that both multinational and 
national enterprises66 meet the core labor standards of the ILO convention, 
even if the government has not ratified the individual conventions that 
enshrine these standards.67 
Because the government of South Korea has been a “State Member of 
the ILO” since 1991,68 the declaration compels the government to ensure 
that South Korean Kaesong companies meet these labor standards.  
However, much like the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Declaration does not 
place any legal duties or liability upon the companies for their labor 
violations at Kaesong.  Instead, the instrument merely “invites” the actors 
“to observe the principles embodied” in the ILO Declaration.69  Therefore, 
the workers cannot rely on the ILO Declaration for a cause of action. 
IV. NORTH KOREAN WORKERS CAN POTENTIALLY SEEK REDRESS AND 
PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS BY BRINGING AN EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM IN 
THE SOUTH KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
“Soft law” such as the OECD Guidelines and the ILO Declaration 
alone do not compel South Korean corporations to conform to just labor 
practices at Kaesong.  Therefore, it is important to ground the arguments for 
just labor practices in laws that will force the South Korean government to 
punish offending South Korean corporations.  The most potent means to 
these ends is to allow the North Korean workers to seek a constitutional 
petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court, claiming that the North 
Korean workers’ labor rights are protected under the South Korean 
                                           
64
  Int’l Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises & Social Policy, at v, (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter ILO Declaration]. 
65
  Id.    
66
  Id. art. 37. 
67
  SAHNI, supra note 53, at 44.  The core labor standards are freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child 
labor and elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. 
68
  EQUITAS: INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS EDUCATION, A UN ROAD MAP: A GUIDE 
FOR PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS 131-34 (2d ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.equitas.org/english/ed-manuals/un-road-map/ch-07-ILO-Member-States.pdf. 
69
  ILO Declaration, supra note 64, at 1. 
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Constitution.  This strategy seeks to place a legal duty upon the South 
Korean government to recognize and protect the labor rights of the North 
Korean workers.  This obligation on the government, in turn, will compel the 
government to hold South Korean corporations accountable through stricter 
regulations and sanctions. 
A. South Korean Jurisprudence Suggests that North Korean Kaesong 
Workers Are Protected Under the South Korean Constitution 
South Korean constitutional jurisprudence indicates that South Korean 
courts may extend constitutional protections to North Korean Kaesong 
workers.  Previously, South Korean courts have extended South Korean 
nationality to North Koreans.70  The South Korean Supreme Court has ruled 
that North Korea is part of the Korean peninsula and thus subject to the 
sovereignty of South Korea.71  Therefore, North Korean residency does not 
“interfere with the acquisition of the nationality of [South Korea].”72  The 
South Korean government supports this judicial assertion of sovereignty 
over North Korea:  “[The Republic of Korea] does not recognize the 
nationality of North Korea.  Therefore, a resident of North Korea can be 
considered as having [South Korean] nationality.”73  Thus North Koreans 
may fall under the constitutional protections afforded to South Korean 
citizens.74 
Recent developments in relations between the Koreas make the 
possibility of extending South Korean constitutional rights to North Koreans 
more than just a legal theoretical possibility.  In December 2004, the Roh 
administration announced a policy change that those who hold “criminal 
records” in North Korea will not be accepted into South Korea.75  The Vice 
Unification Minister stated that those found to have committed crimes in 
North Korea could be tried in South Korea, thus implying South Korean 
jurisdiction over all of North Korea with regard to criminal acts.76  In light of 
these events, a commentator raised the following question:  “if South 
                                           
70
  Decision of August 31, 2000, 12-2 KCCR 167, 97 HunKa 12 (Korean Supreme Court) [hereinafter 
Nationality Act Case]. 
71
  Id.   
72
  Id.   
73
  Id.   
74
  See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, ch. II, translated in MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT 
LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA 47 (2004) (establishing the 
constitutional rights and duties of South Korean citizens) [hereinafter Constitution of Republic of Korea). 
75
  David Scofield, Seoul’s Double-Talk on Reunification, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, MAY 1, 2004, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GA04Dg01.html.  
76
  Id.   
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Korea’s criminal code extends to those accused of crimes in the North, what 
of the South Korean labor laws and human rights code?”77  Specifically, 
since Kaesong workers are legally South Korean citizens under the South 
Korean Constitution, “would it not be illegal to pay them salaries amounting 
to less than one-tenth the nationally defined minimum wage?”78  The answer 
is, arguably, yes.  If the South Korean state accepts North Koreans as 
citizens, then, as de jure citizens of South Korea, under the South Korean 
Constitution, the North Korean Kaesong workers are entitled to the 
protection of their “fundamental and inviolable human rights” by the South 
Korean state.79 
B. An Equal Protection Claim in the South Korean Constitutional Court 
Serves as a Basis for the North Korean Workers’ Potential Litigation 
As de jure South Korean citizens, the North Korean workers may 
bring a constitutional petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court 
alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.  Under 
the Korean legal system, the main role of the Constitutional Court is “to 
protect the individual constitutional rights of the Korean people.”80  The 
South Korean Constitutional Court has held that the principle of equality 
enshrined in Article 11(1) of the Constitution, which states that all citizens 
shall be equal before the law,81 is the “supreme principle in the field of 
protection of basic rights.”82  There are two prerequisites to bringing an 
equal protection petition within the court’s jurisdiction.  First, there must be 
a present and direct harm to the petitioner. 83  Second, the petition must have 
exhausted all ordinary remedies.84  A Kaesong workers’ petition would 
satisfy both these prerequisites. 
                                           
77
  Id.   
78
  Id.   
79
  See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, supra note 74, ch. II, art. 10. 
80
  Jibong Lim, Korean Constitutional Court Standing at the Crossroads: Focusing on Real Cases 
and Variational Types of Decisions, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 352 (2002). 
81
  See Constitution of Republic Of Korea, supra note 74, art. 11(1) (stating that all citizens shall be 
equal before the law, and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, social or cultural life on 
account of gender, religion, or social status). 
82
  Decision of Nov 29, 2001, 13-2 KCCR 714, 99 Hun-Ma 494 (Korean Supreme Court) [hereinafter 
Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans case].  
83
  Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S.IL.U.L.J. 
71, 91 (1997). 
84
  Id.  
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1. The Workers Have Suffered “Present and Direct” Harm 
The workers can demonstrate that they suffered “present and direct 
harm” in Kaesong at the hands of the South Korean government.  Through 
its inaction, the South Korean government has failed to provide Kaesong 
workers the same labor rights afforded to South Korean workers.  This 
failure resulted in the workers’ lost wages, uncompensated overtime pay, and 
the inability to associate in labor unions.85 
Article 68(1) of the South Korean Constitutional Court Act provides 
that any person whose basic rights are infringed upon by exercise or non-
exercise of governmental power may file a constitutional complaint before 
the Constitutional Court.86  The “governmental power” in Article 68(1) that 
is subject to constitutional adjudication refers to all powers including 
legislative, judicial, and administrative.87  The North Korean workers may 
file an equal protection petition with the Constitutional Court claiming that, 
as South Korean nationals, they are denied the state protection granted to 
workers in South Korea.  Specifically, there is a complete lack of both 
legislative and executive action to sanction South Korean corporations at 
Kaesong that violate South Korean constitutional rights.  Under South 
Korean constitutional jurisprudence, the North Korean workers’ 
constitutional claim would constitute a “claim-right” that implicates a duty 
of the state to take affirmative action benefiting claimants.88 
2. Ordinary Remedies Available to the Workers Are “Futile and 
Impracticable” 
The workers’ petition to the Constitutional Court will also satisfy the 
second requirement that ordinary remedies be exhausted.  The court has 
relaxed this requirement, when it would be “futile or impracticable” to rely 
on such remedies.89  The other remedies that would be available to the 
workers would be to negotiate with the corporations at Kaesong to ensure 
better working conditions,90 or to complain to North Korean judicial fora, 
                                           
85
  See supra Part II.B. 
86
  Constitutional Court Act, art. 68(1), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome/ 
act.jsp (last visited Oct 23, 2007); Decision of Dec 24, 1997, 9-2 KCCR 842, 89 Hun-Ma 178 (Korean 
Supreme Court). 
87
  Decision of Oct 15, 1990, 2 KCCR 365, 89 Hun-Ma 178 (Korean Supreme Court).  
88
  Decision of Sept 4, 1989, 1 KCCR 176, 88 Hun-Ma 22 (Korean Supreme Court).  
89
  Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 92. 
90
  Kaesong Labor Regulations, supra note 38, art. 48. 
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namely, the Kaesong labor tribunals91 and North Korean courts.  However, 
both of these means of redress are futile. 
There are indications that Kaesong corporations have made no efforts 
to hold their own operations accountable for labor violations and that these 
corporations are comfortably complicit in the North Korean state’s 
oppression of the workers.  As the president of Dosco Co., a South Korean 
Kaesong corporation, explained, “[i]f I can get good workers, I would build 
factories anywhere, even if the country were ruled by a regime worse than 
that of Kim Jong-Il.”92  Such attitude illustrates that companies may 
prioritize profits over worker conditions.93  Accordingly, the workers may 
not reliably expect redress and protection from their employer-corporation. 
Similarly, seeking redress and protection in the North Korean judicial 
system is not a realistic option for the workers.  North Korean law is “a 
derivative of North Korean party policy, [which is] a means to implement 
State objectives.”94  Courts and other judicial fora are accountable to the 
Supreme People’s Assembly (“SPA”) Presidium or to the SPA in session.95  
Thus, there exists no independent North Korean judiciary.96  Furthermore, 
individual rights are often not acknowledged in North Korean courts.97  
Constitutional rights extend only to citizens who fulfill their duties to the 
State.98  Due to the lack of independence of the North Korean courts from 
the government and the lack of acknowledgment of individual rights by 
those courts, a North Korean judicial forum will not provide a fair hearing to 
the Kaesong workers’ labor complaints that would likely implicate 
government actions such as siphoning salaries and disallowing labor unions. 
C. The South Korean State Has Denied Kaesong Workers Protection 
Under Two Bodies of Law 
The workers’ may assert an equal protection claim alleging that the 
South Korean state has denied them protection under two bodies of law.  
First, the workers could claim that the government has violated customary 
                                           
91
  Id. 
92
  Kim Hyo-jin, The Gaeseong Project: The Dream of ‘Dirt-Cheap’ Labor, JOON ANG DAILY, Nov. 
2, 2003, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/143.html. 
93
  SAHNI, supra note 53, at 275.  
94
  Patricia Goedde, Law “of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North Korean 
Legal System, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1268 (2004).  
95
  Id. at 1276. 
96
  U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2005), available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61612.htm. 
97
  Id.  
98
  Goedde, supra note 94, at 1278. 
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international law enshrined in the South Korean Constitution.  Second, they 
may claim that they are denied labor protections set forth in South Korean 
labor statutes and the Constitution. 
1. The Workers Are Denied Protection Under International Law 
The North Korean workers may claim that the South Korean state has 
not protected their labor rights granted under customary international law.  
Labor rights are human rights as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) includes standards for various labor rights.99  These labor rights 
include the rights of assembly and association,100 freedom of movement,101 
freedom from slavery,102 freedom from discrimination,103 and freedom from 
unjust labor practices,104 which specifically refers to the right to join trade 
unions.105  These rights are universal and restrict states, individuals, and 
corporations from infringing on human rights.106  Thus, labor rights are 
enshrined in the UDHR.107  Even though the UDHR has no formal legally 
binding effect, it is generally accepted that the human rights principles of the 
UDHR have attained the status of customary international law and are 
binding upon all states.108 
The South Korean state violates customary international law by 
failing to ensure the North Korean workers’ rights to just and favorable 
remuneration.109  Specifically, South Korea has a duty to ensure that the 
workers are not denied their rightful wages by the North Korean state and 
the South Korean corporations.110  Also, if the workers are “trafficking 
victims,”111 they are subjected to “forced labor” and are thus denied their 
                                           
99
  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.Y.B. 535, art. 20, U.N. Doc. A/810, U.N. Sales 
No. 1950.I.II (1948-49) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
100
  See id. art. 20. 
101
  See id. art. 13. 
102
  See id. art. 4. 
103
  See id. art. 7 
104
  See id. art. 23. 
105
  See id. art. 23(4).  
106
  John C. Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 467 (2000). 
107
  Id.  
108
  Barbara Macgrady, Note, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in 
U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 271, 289 (1997) (citing U.N. ESCOR Comm'n 
on Hum. Rts., Preliminary Report by the Special Representative of the Commission on the Human Rights 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/20 (1985)).  “Customary 
International Law” is a building block of the international legal system that derives from the practice of 
states and is accepted by them as legally binding. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
109
  See UDHR, supra note 99, art. 23. 
110
  See supra Part II. B. 
111
  Carpenter, supra note 11. 
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freedom from slavery.112  Furthermore, since the Kaesong Labor Law does 
not explicitly grant the other labor rights in the UDHR, such as the right to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, the right to strike, the 
prohibition of sex discrimination and sexual harassment,113 there may be 
other actionable rights violations.114 
According to Article 6 of the South Korean Constitution, customary 
international law has the same effect as Korean domestic law.115  The 
Constitutional Court has confirmed that “international law that is generally 
approved” is a constituent element of the Constitution.116  The court has 
previously considered customary international law as the basis for the 
protection of South Korean citizens’ rights.117  Accordingly, the Kaesong 
workers may invoke Article 6 of the South Korean Constitution and base 
their constitutional claims on the UDHR as customary international law. 
Since the ILO Declaration and OECD Guidelines direct governments 
as well as corporations to follow international labor standards,118 these 
international instruments may also be invoked when appealing to protection 
under international law.  Even as “soft law,” the principles in these 
instruments can help establish a normative structure of international labor 
rights to aid the court.119  Thus, the constitutional petition would be bolstered 
by the persuasive effect of these non-binding guidelines. 
2. The Workers Are Denied Protection Under South Korean Labor Law 
The Kaesong workers may also claim that they are denied protection 
under South Korean labor law statutes.  The Labor Standards Act stipulates 
minimum working standards, such as the direct payment of wages to 
                                           
112
  See UDHR, supra note 99, art. 4. 
113
  HRW, supra note 1, at 2. 
114
  U.S. FEDERAL NEWS, supra note 50. 
115
  Young-Sok Kim, A Korean Perspective on the International Criminal Court and Universal 
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN KOREAN PERSPECTIVE 341-42 (Choon-Hyun Paik ed., 2004). 
116
  Decision of May 14, 2004, 16-1 KCCR 609, 2004 Hun-Na 12 (Korean Supreme Court) 
[hereinafter Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case]  
117
  Decision of April 25, 2002, 14-1 KCCR 351, 98 Hun-Ma 425 (Korean Supreme Court) 
[hereinafter Pledge to Abide by the Law Case] (customary international law was invoked as a primary basis 
for the protection of the freedom of conscience in a recent dissenting opinion in the Constitutional Court); 
see also Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case supra note 82 (Both the South 
Korean government and the dissenting judges invoked “general principles of public international law” to 
advocate for the Past Nationality Principle as the basis for citizenship.  They both argued that a Jus 
Sanguinis basis would amount to discrimination of individuals based on race or nationality.) 
118
  See supra Part III. 
119
  See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, 
ACTORS, PROCESS 89 (2002). 
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workers120 and restrictions on extended work.121  Kaesong operations violate 
these provisions as the workers’ salaries are not directly handed to them and 
they are expected to work unpaid overtime.122  Because Kaesong operations 
ban unionization, they also violate the Trade Union and Labor Relations 
Adjustment Act, which grants the right to unionize.123 
The North Korean workers may also claim that they have not been 
afforded equal protection to enjoy the labor rights explicitly granted in the 
South Korean Constitution.  The Constitution includes the right to 
“independent association, collective bargaining and collective action.”124  
The Constitution also provides protection for a “minimum wage system 
under the conditions as prescribed by Act.”125  The “Act” in a Kaesong 
worker’s case would be the Kaesong Labor Law, which the South Korean 
government and corporations violate by not paying the workers directly.126  
Thus, the worker’s equal protection claim may appeal to protection under 
labor law statutes as well as the labor law provisions in the Constitution. 
V. PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL BARRIERS STAND BETWEEN KAESONG 
WORKERS AND THEIR POTENTIAL LITIGATION EFFORTS IN THE SOUTH 
KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Opening the doors of the South Korean Constitutional Court to 
transnational rights litigation is no straightforward task.  Both practical and 
procedural barriers hinder Kaesong workers’ potential litigation in South 
Korea.  First, Kaesong workers face severe penalties under North Korean 
law if they attempt to leave the state for purposes of pursuing litigation in 
South Korea.  Second, the significance of this state-imposed barrier is 
heightened by Constitutional Court procedure that bars third parties from 
representing the Kaesong workers in court.  Third, South Korean law does 
not establish clear jurisdiction over Kaesong workers.  Fourth, South Korean 
law does not permit workers to file suits anonymously, which deters labor-
related suits for fear of adverse employment action, such as retaliatory 
                                           
120
  See Labor Standards Act, ch. III art. 42, Act No. 6974 (Sep. 15, 2003) (S. Korea), translated in 
MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN KOREA 1883 
(2004). 
121
  See id. at ch. IV 1885. 
122
  See supra Part II.B. 
123
  See Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, ch. II, Act No. 6456 (Mar. 28, 2001) (S. 
Korea), translated in MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION, ECONOMIC LAWS ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN KOREA 1912 (2004). 
124
  See Republic Of Korea Constitution supra note 74, art. 33.  
125
  Id. art. 32.  
126
  See supra Part II.B. 
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termination.  These practical and procedural hurdles obstruct the workers’ 
transnational rights litigation in the Constitutional Court.  
A. The Workers Will Be Barred from Leaving North Korea to Pursue 
Litigation 
The North Korean workers will be unable to pursue litigation in South 
Korea because North Korean law prohibits the unauthorized departure of 
North Korean citizens from the state.127  North Koreans who “illegally” 
cross or help others in crossing the North Korean border face penalties.128  A 
person who illegally crosses “a frontier of the Republic” faces a sentence of 
up to three years in a kwalliso, a political penal labor colony.129  Further, an 
official with the “frontier administration” who helps “someone to violate a 
frontier” faces a sentence in a kwalliso for a period of between two and 
seven years.130 
It is unclear under what conditions North Korean authorities would 
allow North Koreans to leave the country.  However, the fact that tens of 
thousands risk these heavy penalties by crossing into China’s northeastern 
provinces in search of food131 indicates that the authorities are not willing to 
authorize North Koreans to depart even to fulfill basic needs such as food.  
Thus, North Korean authorities will not likely authorize departure to pursue 
litigation abroad in which the North Korean state is implicated in the wrongs 
that are the focus of the litigation. 
B. Constitutional Court Procedure Bars Third Parties from Representing 
the Workers 
Compounding the immobility of the Kaesong workers, South Korean 
Constitutional Court procedure bars third parties in South Korea from filing 
the constitutional petition on behalf of the workers.  Specifically, 
Constitutional Court procedure requires that “[a] constitutional complaint 
can only be filed by individuals whose basic rights have been violated.”132  A 
                                           
127
  Amnesty Int’l, Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (North Korea), AI Index ASA 24/003/2004, Jan. 17, 2004, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa240032004. 
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  Id.  
129
  The North Korean law which prohibits unauthorized departure is in clear breach of the 
fundamental right to leave one’s own country. art. 12(2) of the ICCPR, to which North Korea is a state 
party, states that “(e)veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.” Id. 
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  Many who fled to countries like China and were forcibly returned to North Korea were subjected 
to punishment including arbitrary detention, forced labor, and, in some cases, the death penalty. Id. 
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  Id.  
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  Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82. 
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person whose basic right has been violated “does not include a third party 
who only has indirect, practical, or economic interest in the matter.”133  The 
court thus places the burden on the petitioner that he or she is the “bearer” of 
the basic rights at issue.134 
The inability to have South Korean third parties file the petition on 
behalf of the North Korean workers and the requirement that the workers 
demonstrate that they are, in fact, the bearers of the rights at issue create 
barriers to filing a constitutional petition.  Constitutional Court procedure 
requires that, in order to file a constitutional petition the North Korean 
workers would have to acquire the services of a qualified attorney.135  
Further, the workers (along with the attorney) would have to make written 
submissions to the court on such matters as the claimants’ and their 
attorney’s identities, the allegedly infringed right, and the exercise or non-
exercise of public power that gave rise to the rights infringement.136 
Contacting and hiring an attorney who will take their case to the South 
Korean Constitutional Court and completing the necessary administrative 
procedures such as making the written submissions pose practical difficulties 
to the North Korean workers.  The “qualified attorney”137 that the North 
Korean workers will have to acquire will likely be an attorney currently in 
South Korea.138  While average North Koreans cannot leave the country in 
order to pursue litigation,139 they also have few channels of communication 
with the outside world due to North Korean governmental restrictions on 
freedom of expression.140  For example, the government has banned the use 
                                           
133
  Decision of April 29, 2004, 16-1 KCCR 601, 2003 Hun-Ma 81 (Korean Supreme Court). 
134
  Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82.  
135
  For cases in which the party is a private person, it is impossible for the Constitutional Court to 
make a request for judgment or conduct oral proceedings without the person’s representing attorney, unless 
the private person himself is a qualified attorney. In the event private persons have no financial resources to 
nominate an attorney to be their representative, they may request the Constitutional Court to nominate a 
court-designated attorney.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONSTITUTIONAL 
JUSTICE IN KOREA 29 (1990).  See also Constitutional Court Act, art. 25(3) (Legal Representative), art. 70 
(Court Appointed Counsel), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english (follow “Constitutional 
Court Act” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
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  THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA 
36 (1990); Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 71(1) (Matters to Be Stated On Written Request). 
137
  See Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 25(3) (Legal Representative). 
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  A “qualified attorney” is an attorney, who has passed the South Korean Bar exam and spent two 
years at the Judicial Research and Training Institute, which is run by the Supreme Court. Asia Pacific Legal 
500, Overview – South Korea, http://www.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 
1136&l5country_code=sk&l5directory=as500&Itemid=398 (last visited Oct 23, 2007). 
139
  See supra Part V.A. 
140
  INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, MAKING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS WORK: 
COUNTRY PROFILE ON NORTH KOREA (DRAFT), http://www.ibcr.org/Publications/CRC/ 
Draft_CP_Asia/NorthKoreaPDF.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007). 
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of cell phones141 and restricted internet access to high-ranking officials and 
other designated elites.142  Thus, these government restrictions on the 
workers’ contact with the outside world severely impairs their ability to 
acquire the representation of a qualified attorney who can file their 
constitutional petition in the Constitutional Court and collaborate with that 
attorney to fulfill other procedural requirements such as producing written 
submissions. 
C. South Korean Law Does Not Establish Clear Jurisprudence over 
North Koreans 
Despite theoretical legal arguments and supporting international 
relations developments,143 there is no well-established South Korean 
jurisprudence on transnational litigation that allows for South Korean 
jurisdiction over North Koreans.  As explained above in Part V, the South 
Korean Constitutional Court may have jurisdiction over Kaesong worker 
claims for constitutional violations.144  This ambiguity over jurisdiction is 
heightened by South Korea’s stance that diplomatic tensions with North 
Korea will worsen if South Korean courts place North Koreans under South 
Korean jurisdiction.145  Indeed, in spite of the unprecedented boom in 
constitutional adjudication at the Constitutional Court, the court has shown 
substantial reservation with regard to such cases with highly political 
implications.146  Thus, the Constitutional Court may well dismiss the 
litigation for lack of jurisdiction over the North Korean workers. 
D. Constitutional Court Procedure Does Not Allow for Suit Under 
Pseudonyms 
Because the court requires the individuals to prove that they are the 
bearer of rights at issue,147 the Kaesong workers cannot mask their identity.  
The South Korean procedural rules do not allow for pseudonyms to protect 
the identities of the workers.148  This may leave the petitioner-workers 
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  North Korea Bans Mobile Phones, TEXTUALLY.ORG, June 4, 2004, http://www.textually.org/ 
textually/archives/2004/06/004040.htm. 
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  U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 96. 
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  See supra Part IV.A. 
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  See Nationality Act Case, supra note 70. 
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  DAE-KYU YOON, RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 42 (2000). 
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  Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case, supra note 82. 
148
  See Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, art. 71(1) (“Matters to Be Stated On Written 
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vulnerable to retaliatory termination of employment or other punitive action 
from either the North Korean state or employer corporations upon the 
workers’ return to Kaesong. 
VI. SOUTH KOREA MUST FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION TO SUBJECT CORPORATIONS TO SUIT FOR 
KAESONG LABOR VIOLATIONS 
In light of the significant problems barring Kaesong workers from 
vindicating their labor rights, the South Korean Constitutional Court and the 
South Korean legislature should adopt a new set of domestic procedural 
rules to facilitate actions that hold South Korean corporations accountable 
for unjust labor practices at Kaesong and other extra-territorial economic 
operations.  The procedural barriers inherent in the South Korean judicial 
system largely contribute to this denial of judicial consideration of Kaesong 
workers’ rights violations.  However, international developments in 
transnational litigation demonstrate ways to circumvent or overcome such 
barriers and allow courts to consider extraterritorial rights violations 
committed by corporations incorporated within its jurisdiction. 
A. The South Korean Legislature and the Constitutional Court Have the 
Capacity to Amend the Procedural Rules of the Constitutional Court 
to Accommodate Kaesong Workers’ Litigation 
Both the legislature and the Constitutional Court have the capacity to 
amend the Constitutional Court’s procedure.  After the court was established 
in 1988, the legislature defined the procedural role of the Constitutional 
Court by passing the Constitutional Court Act.149  While the Constitution 
briefly mentions the powers and the functions of the court,150 the 
Constitutional Court Act elaborates upon these powers and functions.151  
Thus, the legislature can alter the court’s procedure within the bounds set by 
the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court defines its own procedure by making 
regulations and by liberally constructing extant procedural requirements.  
The court has the authority to make regulations to manage its own affairs, 
including its own procedures for adjudication—as long as they do not 
                                           
149
  Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 75-76. 
150
  See Constitution of the Republic of Korea, supra note 74, arts. 111-13. 
151
  Id.  See also Constitutional Court Act, supra note 86, ch. IV  (includes detailed procedural rules 
set forth in chapters on “General Procedure of Adjudication” and “Special Adjudication Procedures”). 
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exceed the bounds of the Constitutional Court Act.152  The court has also 
employed many new techniques in pursuing its intention to “safeguard the 
constitution” and to “protect the fundamental rights of the people.”153  These 
techniques include liberally constructing procedural rules such as 
“justiciability requirements.”154  Thus, the court itself can take measures to 
alter its procedural rules. 
The South Korean legislature and the Constitutional Court have the 
capacity to change the procedural rules of the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore both the legislature and the court must look to the following 
international trends in transnational litigation in crafting procedural rules 
that would allow the North Korean Kaesong workers to pursue litigation in 
the Constitutional Court. 
B. South Korea Should Follow Developments in South Asian Public 
Interest Litigation to Relax Standing Requirements and Allow Third 
Party Suits  
The North Korean workers, whose freedom of movement is severely 
circumscribed by the North Korean state, face a formidable barrier in 
pursuing litigation in the South Korean Constitutional Court because 
standing rules require the injured party itself to file suit and bar third party 
suits.155  Public interest litigation in South Asia, especially in India, provides 
a procedural model to circumvent this problem.  South Asian courts have 
encouraged third party litigation on behalf of “those without the capacity to 
sue.”156 
Indian courts have relaxed the requirement that a litigant must be 
present in court to sue where there is an overriding public need.  The seminal 
Indian Supreme Court judgment in S.P Gupta v. Union of India established 
that the strict rule of locus standi157 changes “[when] there has been a 
violation of the constitutional or legal rights of persons who by reason of 
their socially or economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach 
                                           
152
  THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 15 (1996).  
153
  Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 83, at 88. 
154
  Id.  These requirements are substantially similar to the justiciability requirements under art. 3 of 
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the Court for judicial redress.”158  Under this principle, the “reasons” that 
make a person unable to approach a court for relief include “poverty, 
helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged 
position.”159 
When such circumstances are present, the court asserted that any third 
party member of the public can maintain an application for an appropriate 
direction, order, or writ.160  Thus, lawyers, public interest groups, social 
workers, and journalists would be able to file a bona fide plea on behalf of 
those who could not access the court.161  The Indian Supreme Court has 
further extended this principle by accepting letters or newspaper petitions.162  
This principle has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan163 
and has been considered in Bangladeshi courts.164 
Equitable considerations of fair access to justice compel South Korea 
to adopt a similar relaxed rule on locus standi.  As mentioned before,165 such 
equitable considerations are important because the constitutional petition in 
the Constitutional Court carries overtones of an equitable remedy.166  The 
Constitutional Court and the South Korean legislature should change 
Constitutional Court procedure to ease current standing rules and allow for 
third parties to file suit on behalf of the North Korean workers.  Doing so 
will allow concerned third parties in South Korea to file suit on the workers’ 
behalf.  These concerned parties could potentially include the South Korean 
branch of Human Rights Watch,167 human rights lawyers from “Lawyers for 
Democratic Society,”168 and North Korean dissident groups.169 
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C. South Korea Should Follow Developments in the European Union and 
United States to Extend Court Jurisdiction to Hear Extraterritorial 
Constitutional Claims Against Domestically Owned Corporations 
Although the South Korean Constitutional Court may construe 
jurisdiction over North Koreans in North Korea,170 there is no established 
rule to this effect.  Lack of jurisdiction over extraterritorial violations of the 
Korean Constitution may prove fatal to the viability of the Kaesong workers’ 
potential litigation.  However, legal developments in the European Union 
and the United States indicate that there is a growing trend in transnational 
litigation that overcomes such jurisdictional barriers. 
For example, as an E.U. member-state, the United Kingdom’s courts 
are bound by the Brussels Regulation, which permits a company to be sued 
at its place of domicile—either the location of its statutory seat, central 
administration, or principal place of business.171  English common law has 
interpreted these provisions to conform with Article 2 of the Brussels 
Convention, which provides that an action must be brought in the 
defendant’s domicile.172  Recently, the House of Lords has passed legislation 
permitting U.K. courts to hear compensation claims from claimants 
demanding the accountability of transnational corporations for torts 
committed in foreign countries.173 
The European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has extended its jurisdictional 
reach to plaintiffs domiciled in a state not party to the Brussels 
Convention.174  The ECJ’s holding provides a codified system for 
determining jurisdiction, and favors the employee as the weaker party.175  
Thus, the ECJ has effectively precluded the application of forum non 
conveniens if a defendant is based in the European Union.176 
In the United States, the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a means 
of holding corporations liable for international human rights violations.177  
The ATCA expressly provides U.S. district courts with original jurisdiction 
over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”178  The Ninth Circuit in 
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Doe v. Unocal Corp. held that forced labor is among the “handful of 
crimes . . . to which the law of nations attributes individual liability” such 
that state action is not required.179  This suit concerned human rights 
violations during Unocal’s construction of a pipeline in Myanmar.  Unocal 
eventually settled the case in 2004.180  A lawyer for the Myanmar villagers 
stated that the settlement would help “develop programs to improve living 
conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of people from 
the pipeline region.”181  The effect of the suit on Unocal was substantial even 
before it agreed to the settlement.  The suit had created uncertainty in 
Unocal’s future investing and was a costly disruption in its operations.182  
The negative publicity that arose from the case was also expected to damage 
the company’s brand equity.183 
Even though no verdicts have been officially rendered against 
companies for extraterritorial torts under the ATCA, corporations are 
reacting to the possible impact of such litigation.184  ATCA suits compel the 
corporations to consider the importance of complying with human rights 
laws in making their investment decisions.185  For example, ChevronTexaco 
ended its oil development in Ecuador following a lawsuit that was eventually 
dismissed by a federal judge.186  A ChevronTexaco official stated that the 
litigation was not a “positive indicator” for Ecuador as a venue for continued 
business, and that the threat of similar litigation adds an element of risk that 
makes the corporation less competitive.187  Thus, whatever the outcome of 
the litigation, the very fact that plaintiffs are given the opportunity to be 
heard in court is an important mechanism to hold a corporation accountable. 
The South Korean legislature and Constitutional Court must look to 
these jurisdictional developments in E.U. and U.S. law as normative models 
that facilitate transnational litigation in domestic courts.  Both the legislature 
and the Constitutional Court should accordingly enact regulations that would 
allow for constitutional petitions from foreign litigants injured by the actions 
of South Korean corporations.  The adoption of the procedural principles in 
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these models will allow for North Korean Kaesong workers to sue the South 
Korean corporations in the Constitutional Court. 
D. South Korea Should Follow the Model Established by U.S. Law That 
Allows Litigants to Maintain Anonymity in Labor Rights Cases 
Because Constitutional Court procedure does not provide for suit 
under pseudonyms,188 North Korean workers would be vulnerable to 
retaliation from both the South Korean employers and the North Korean 
state for bringing rights litigation in South Korea.  Thus, in order to protect 
the workers from such negative repercussions, it is vital that the petitioner-
workers’ identities be protected. 
A landmark labor rights case in the United States has demonstrated 
that suit under pseudonyms is an essential component in international labor 
rights litigation.189  Recently, the U.S. Ninth Circuit found that foreign 
employees can anonymously bring suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs both prejudice to opposing 
party and public interest in knowing the party’s identity.190  The claimants in 
this case were mostly Chinese garment workers in Saipan, a commonwealth 
of the United States.191  The Ninth Circuit allowed the workers to use 
pseudonyms in place of their actual names because they feared that, if their 
identities were disclosed to defendants and other nonparties to the action, 
they would be fired from their jobs, deported, and subsequently arrested and 
imprisoned by the People’s Republic of China.192 
Similarly, the South Korean Constitutional Court and the legislature 
must adopt such procedural rules that ensure anonymity of plaintiff-workers 
in order to protect Kaesong workers from retaliation by South Korean 
employers or the North Korean government.  The Constitutional Court 
should permit anonymity to any claimant who can demonstrate the 
reasonable likelihood or fear of retaliation to file anonymously. 
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VII. MEASURES OUTSIDE THE COURTS WILL ALSO PROMOTE GREATER 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE SOUTH KOREAN CORPORATIONS 
A constitutional petition from Kaesong workers would require the 
Constitutional Court and legislature to pursue progressive implementation of 
developments in transnational litigation.  Moreover, litigation alone does not 
address the urgency of protecting the North Korean workers from ongoing 
labor rights violations.  Therefore, the South Korean government and the 
South Korean public must take measures outside of the courts to achieve 
expeditious results.  Two prominent and potentially effective measures 
outside the courts would be halting South Korean government assistance to 
corporations that commit rights violations and initiating shareholder pressure 
on Kaesong corporations that violate constitutional rights.  These measures 
complement changes to the court’s jurisdiction and should be pursued 
contemporaneously.  They will foster an environment of accountability, 
which the Constitutional Court can eventually build upon when adjudicating 
the workers’ claims.  Thus, these extra-judicial measures effectively lay the 
ground for a potentially successful litigation of the Kaesong workers’ rights. 
A. Cutting Off Government Assistance Is an Effective Means of Holding 
Violative Corporations Accountable 
The South Korean government should consider halting the assistance 
currently given to corporations that violate the labor rights of the Kaesong 
workers.  The government should make the support it provides individual 
South Korean Kaesong corporations conditional upon the corporation’s 
showing of a good corporate social responsibility record.  Thus, the large tax 
breaks and publicity that the South Korean government provides193 must be 
halted immediately to those corporations complicit in the Kaesong 
violations. 
This recommendation follows from Canadian efforts to strengthen 
corporate social responsibility.  In pursuing stronger corporate social 
responsibility in its transnational mining industry, the Canadian government 
considered linking the provision of government services to businesses, 
including export and project financing, to their adherence to corporate social 
responsibility standards.194  These standards aim at achieving a sustainable 
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balance of benefits for business, employees, stakeholders, and the 
communities and the environment within which the business operates.195 
Enforcement of corporate social responsibility standards in North 
Korea may be difficult to implement.  While the Canadian government had 
“National Contact Points,” which investigated corporate social responsibility 
violations in the countries where its corporations functioned,196 the South 
Korean government has no such investigatory contact point in North Korea.  
Further, the North Korean state will not likely allow such an entity in 
Kaesong.  Independent monitoring agencies will likely be denied access into 
the tightly-secured SEZ.  Thus, it will be difficult for the South Korean 
government to discern which corporations should be deprived of government 
assistance.  Nonetheless, placing a burden upon corporations to show good 
corporate practices as a condition to government assistance may compel the 
corporations to improve the conditions at Kaesong. 
B. Shareholder Pressure Is an Effective Means of Holding Violative 
Corporations Accountable 
South Korean shareholders of the Kaesong corporations must take 
advantage of such instruments as shareholder resolutions to hold offending 
corporations accountable.  In the United States, through shareholder 
resolutions placed before corporate directors, shareholders increasingly call 
for companies to pull out of projects implicated in human rights law suits.197  
For example, responding to a shareholder resolution and negative publicity 
from a pending human rights law suit, Calgary-based Talisman Energy sold 
its U.S. $770 million stake in an oil development project in Sudan.198 
Under South Korean law, shareholders have statutory authority to 
control certain aspects of the company through such mechanisms as the right 
to vote and binding shareholder resolutions.199  Shareholders can discipline 
the company by such acts as electing or removing directors,200 merging or 
dissolving the corporation,201 and transferring the whole or an important part 
of business.202  Thus, statutorily, shareholders have substantial control over 
the activities of a corporation. 
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Recent legal reform in corporate governance in South Korea has led to 
a rise in shareholder activism.203  Such activist efforts have been headed by 
non-governmental organizations such as chamyeoyundai (the Participatory 
Economic Committee of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy), 
which act on behalf of shareholders204 by revealing companies with low 
accountability.205  With the support of the South Korean government, such 
civic organizations have taken on the role of whistleblowers that strive to 
prevent managerial abuse and improve transparency and efficiency.206 
South Korean shareholders and their representative civic organizations 
must take advantage of this climate of promoting corporate accountability 
and extend their activism to the advocacy of responsible labor practices in 
Kaesong.  Thus, shareholder activism presents an effective means in the 
hands of the South Korean public to hold the Kaesong corporations 
accountable for labor rights violations. 
VIII. BROADER POLITICAL REALITIES WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT IN 
REALIZING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The feasibility of recommendations to hold South Korean 
corporations accountable both inside and outside the courts must be seen in 
light of the political realities of the Korean peninsula.  On the one hand, 
tense relations between the North and the South pose a formidable barrier to 
implementing these recommendations.  On the other hand, U.S. pressure on 
South Korea to cease economic support to the North may favor such 
implementation. 
The South Korean government states that although it is frustrated with 
the North Korea’s refusal to halt its nuclear ambitions, it sees no other option 
but to engage them.207  It believes that ending cooperative projects will only 
worsen inter-Korean relations and increase the danger of military clashes on 
the divided Korean peninsula.208  Thus, if South Korea were to hold Kaesong 
corporations accountable for labor violations in which North Korea is also 
complicit, then such a move would likely be viewed by North Korea as 
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adversarial or, at least, uncooperative.  This could potentially undo the good 
relations that have developed between the two Koreas since the Sunshine 
Policy was instituted in 2000.  It is possible that the Constitutional Court of 
South Korea will defer to the South Korean government’s policy to pacify 
the North and deny suit to Kaesong workers.209 
On the other hand, pressure from the United States on South Korea to 
halt funding of North Korean human rights abuses is at the fore of the 
ongoing developments in a free trade agreement (“FTA”) between South 
Korea and the U.S.  While South Korea wants Kaesong products to be 
recognized as “Made in South Korea,” U.S. officials and lawmakers have 
not been receptive, raising questions about labor standards and reports that 
the North Korean state is siphoning the workers’ wages.210  Kaesong posed a 
persistent obstacle in the preliminary FTA negotiations between the two 
countries.211  As the FTA now awaits ratification in the U.S. Congress, the 
disagreement on Kaesong remains unresolved.212  Some U.S. officials claim 
that South Korea, in partnering with North Korea to establish Kaesong, is 
prolonging the life of the Kim Jong-Il regime at the expense of the North 
Korean people.213  The Bush administration’s special envoy for human rights 
in North Korea stated that projects like Kaesong strengthened Kim Jong-Il 
by pumping hundreds of millions of dollars into the North.214  The 
administration accused the South of economically propping up the North, as 
the United States financially squeezed the North elsewhere.215  Thus, an 
attempt by South Korea to follow the above recommendations with a view to 
holding violative corporations accountable may ease the roadblocks 
surrounding Kaesong in the ongoing FTA developments. 
It is difficult to surmise which one of these countervailing pressures 
upon South Korea is stronger.  Such political forces unpredictably ebb and 
flow on the volatile Korean Peninsula.  These broader political realities 
influence whether Kaesong workers can look to South Korea for redress to 
and protection from the violation of their labor rights. 
                                           
209
  The Constitutional Court is noted for suffering heavy impacts by such political pressure from the 
South Korean government. Jibong Lim, supra note 80, at 353. 
210
  Carpenter, supra note 11. 
211
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
212
  Oxford Analytica, South Korea/US: FTA Jumps Major Hurdles, Faces Others, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., April 3, 2007. 
213
  Jettel, supra note 5. 
214
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 
215
  Norimitsu Onishi, supra note 2. 




If unification of the two Koreas is South Korea’s ultimate goal in 
building a peace regime through inter-Korean cooperation,216 then South 
Korea must see all Koreans as equal and extend to North Koreans the rights 
currently granted to South Koreans.  However, the South Korean state has 
neglected to address the violations against the North Korean workers at 
Kaesong.  Kaesong is of particular importance in the larger struggle for 
human rights in North Korea, as it is one of the few areas where South 
Korea exercises some political leverage over the North Korean 
government.217  Allowing the Kaesong workers to pursue a constitutional 
petition in the South Korean Constitutional Court will be a significant 
advance towards South Korea’s lofty goal of bridging the Cold War divide 
on the Korean peninsula. 
                                           
216
  See also, CHO, supra note 28, at 4.  
217
  Jettel, supra note 5.  
